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Recent Trends and Challenges in the Labour Market in Belarus 
 
Executive Summary 
The labour market plays an important role in the Belarusian economy. It is characterized by 
state dominance, as the private sector is relatively small, and overregulation. The policy of 
sustaining low wage disparities and excessive employment allows the authorities to eliminate 
inequality and curtail poverty, thus includes important functions of social policy. However, the 
economic costs of this policy are quite high, and are present in form of an inefficient allocation 
of the labour force due to its low mobility and weak motivation.  
Against this background, a number of challenges have arisen, which make a policy reaction 
necessary. First, Belarus’ labour market is experiencing a shortage of labour supply due to 
long-term negative demographic factors. Second, this problem is aggravated by labour migra-
tion, which seems to have picked up recently, even though exact numbers are difficult to ob-
tain. A main reason for this outflow of labour is the significant wage differential with Russia, 
which increased during the recent crisis in 2011. Russia is a key destination country, as there 
is no language barrier and limited regulation barriers due to different integration agreements 
between Belarus and Russia, the most prominent being the common economic space (CES). 
Labour migration is accompanied by a brain drain, as highly motivated and educated persons 
(top managers, engineers) are leaving the country. Another structural problem aggravated by 
the labour outflow is the growing dependency ratio, which puts pressure on the social security 
system. Ultimately, the factors mentioned above create downward pressure on the productivity 
and competitiveness of Belarus’ economy. A vicious circle might be the result of these adverse 
dynamics. 
How should policy makers respond to this uncomfortable situation? So far, their response to 
the migration pressure has been limited to hikes in salaries and incomes, coupled with certain 
administrative measures to restrict cross-border mobility for certain industries. This approach 
is problematic, as broad-based wage increases that are not covered by productivity gains will 
lead to an unsustainable macroeconomic situation. It should well be remembered that such a 
situation was one of the reasons for the 2011 balance-of-payments crisis, and thus should not 
be repeated.  
Thus, another approach of structural changes should be followed, which tackles the existing 
problem at its root with a different set of instruments. The key issue is to ensure productivity 
gains, which form the basis for subsequent wage increases. For this to happen, a wide-ranging 
liberalization of the labour market is a key condition. This implies also a de-coupling of social 
policy issues from labour market policies to a certain degree. Increasing the mobility of the 
labour force (relocation) across sectors will certainly have a positive impact in this respect, as 
a lot of potential is still underutilized. Higher mobility means also creating more opportunities 
for private sector initiatives, and here SME development should be an important focus. In this 
context, a favourable business environment plays a key supporting role as a driver. However, 
it is also a key attraction for return migration, which should be supported officially. It is often 
argued that return migration transforms the previous brain drain into additional gains to the 
economy, as returnees brings new knowledge, technologies and investments. 
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1. Introduction 
The labour market plays an important role in the Belarusian economy. It is characterized by 
state dominance, as the private sector is relatively small, and overregulation. The policy of 
sustaining low wage disparities and excessive employment allows the authorities to eliminate 
inequality and curtail poverty, thus includes important functions of social policy. Moreover, 
state regulation of the labour market is a key element of the political business cycle, which 
functions in Belarus for a long period of time (Haiduk (2007)). The economic costs of this poli-
cy are also high and are present in form of an inefficient allocation of the labour force due to 
its low mobility and weak motivation. This implies labour shortages in some sectors, and high 
unit labour costs in others because of excessive employment. 
An important feature of Belarus’ labour market is an open border with Russia and low barriers 
for getting employed there. The presence of this opportunity of labour migration is actually 
treated as an element of a social contract in Belarus (Silitsky (2010)). Those who are not satis-
fied with their well-being, either by being underpaid due to employment in loss-making enter-
prises, or striving for a better living and self-fulfillment are provided with the opportunity to 
exit from the contract and search for employment abroad. However, the scale of labour migra-
tion was not large enough to influence the domestic labour market and economic policy. 
The situation changed fundamentally after the balance of payments and currency crisis in 
2011. It resulted in a rapidly growing wage differential between Belarus and Russia, which 
amplified labour migration. The consequences of this migration flow were labour shortages 
faced by numerous sectors of the economy. That included construction which has been a cru-
cial sector for Belarus economic policy. The short-term solution to the problem by policy mak-
ers was to increase wages to pre-crisis level, even though this led to other problems in terms 
of loss of competitiveness. In general, a solution to labour migration issues needs a long-term 
approach. The establishment of the common economic space (CES) implies that employment 
opportunities in Russia, Kazakhstan and perhaps also other new members will remain open in 
the long-run, and will correspondingly impact the socio-economic development. 
Alongside substantial parts of the low-skilled construction labour force, which are highly paid in 
Russia, Belarus was left by healthcare personnel, top and medium level managers, and other 
high-skilled labour force. Their migration resulted not only in a reduction of labour supply, but 
also falling total factor productivity due to the brain drain. Furthermore, Belarus demographic 
prospects imply growing pressure on the social security system. Thus, a reduction of employ-
ment means additional tax burden on the remaining labour force. These challenges, facilitated 
by the recent crisis and the creation of the CES, have a structural nature and need to be ad-
dressed by economic policy in order to sustain prospects of economic growth in Belarus. The 
goal of this paper is to present policy measures that may contribute in mitigation of negative 
consequences of labour migration within CES agreement. 
The paper is structured as follows: The second chapter provides some information on labour 
market regulations in regional integration agreements. Apart from theoretical considerations 
on the effects that regional integration agreements may have on the labour market, we study 
the labour market regulations within the CES and Belarus-Russia bilateral agreements. The 
third chapter discusses labour market challenges, arising from labour migration within the CES 
for Belarus. The fourth chapter concludes and provides policy recommendations. 
 
2. Labour market regulations in regional integration agreements 
2.1. Theoretical considerations 
One of the stages of a regional economic integration process is a common market which is 
based on a customs union and guarantees not only free movement of goods and services, but 
also certain mobility of labour and capital within member states. The main idea of these 
agreements is to boost economic development through trade liberalization between the econ-
omies and accelerate the investment process. The number of common markets is not that high 
globally, as it prerequisites a high degree of economic policy unification. The EU and its 
agreements with non-EU Western Europe states (like EEA, EFTA), CARICOM and the Common 
Economic Space of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia may be used as examples of integration 
agreements that include a common market.   
6 
The creation of a common market doesn’t assume that its member’s economic development 
will be equal by any definition. Thus, in case one of the members is more effective with a high-
er level of living that will simultaneously imply an outflow of the labour force from other mem-
bers to the most successful one, i.e. migration. The answer to the question on who of the 
members gain more in terms of migration is ambiguous as there might be both benefits and 
negative consequences (Handijski, et. al (2010)). Pros and cons for receiving countries depend 
on the affected group. For example, an increased inflow of immigrants will likely lead to a de-
crease of wages in the labour market. Thus, local employees will lose because of newcomers. 
On the other hand the economy in general will benefit, as the level of labour competitiveness 
will go up, and the allocation of labour improves. Speaking about sending countries, losses are 
mostly connected with the brain drain. On the flip side, possible benefits for the countries 
might be gained through return migration, remittances, technological transfer and expansion 
of network, which is beneficial in terms of trading.  
2.2. Belarus’ participation in the common economic space (CES) 
Belarus actively participates in regional integration initiatives that regularly arise within CIS 
countries. However, the economic value of most of these initiatives has been rather low due to 
political and economic reasons, leaving integration within CIS at the level of an incomplete free 
trade area (Tochitskaya (2010)). The custom union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, 
established in 2009, seems to be the first multilateral arrangement that has gone beyond offi-
cial documents and is being implemented in reality. The main achievement of the union was 
the introduction of a common customs tariff. 
The creation of the common economic space (CES) is viewed as the next level of the integra-
tion process between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The related agreement came into force 
in 2012; however, a full-fledged common market is anticipated to start functioning only in 
2016. There have been talks that the integration process should be accelerated, which is politi-
cally motivated. Nevertheless, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia have already signed and rati-
fied several agreements on free labour force movement, which is an important step towards a 
functioning common and single market. 
Provisions of the agreement regarding the legal status of labour migrants and members of 
their families are claimed to facilitate labour mobility between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
The most important terms are summarized in EDB (2012) and include: 
 CES citizens can be freely employed in any CES country; no permissions or any other 
additional documents are required. For non-CES citizen employment in Russia requires i) 
employer applying for the permission for hiring foreigners, ii) the employee applying for a 
permission for employment in Russia, and iii) foreigner falling within quotas for labour 
migrants set yearly. In Belarus, employment of non-CES citizens is complicated by simi-
lar barriers: permission for employment for labour migrant and permission to hire labour 
migrants if their number exceeds 10 persons. 
 The period for registration in hosting country for labour migrants is increased from 5-7 to 
30 days. 
 The period of uninterrupted residence in hosting country for labour migrants and their 
family members is limited only by the term of employment contract. For non-CES citizens 
this period ranges from 30 to 90 days depending on local legislation provisions. 
However, as far as Belarus-Russia labour migration is concerned, all these norms were in place 
prior to the CES agreements. According to the resolution of the Supreme Council of Belarus 
and Russia Community #4 of 22 June, 1996 citizens of Belarus and Russia were exempted 
from labour migration regulations and were addressed as local labour force. So the key innova-
tion of CES agreement is that these norms are geographically extended to Kazakhstan. 
Furthermore, the experts of the EBD stress that there is clause in the agreement that allows 
CES members to introduce barriers for labour migrants from CES countries. This can occur in 
case it is necessary to protect the national security, among other strategic sectors of the econ-
omy, or combat unemployment. Moreover, national legislation, at least in Belarus, implies that 
international agreements are not necessary higher in legal hierarchy than national legal acts. 
In addition to labour market issues, agreements signed by Belarus and Russia cover also social 
services provision for labour migrants. They imply that labour migrants and their relatives are 
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provided with free emergency services and any health care services on a fee basis. Further-
more, family members of labour migrants have access to secondary and vocational education 
on an equal basis with the local population. The same terms are set in “Convention on Legal 
Status of Labour Migrants and Their Family Members within CIS”, ratified by Belarus in 2010. 
However, it has not entered into force yet as other countries didn’t ratify it. Belarus has also 
an agreement with Russia on pension provision. According to it, if a person worked in both 
countries during his/her lifetime, he/she receives a pension from both states proportionally to 
the period of contributions (Bobrova, Shahotska, Shymanovich (2012)). So a part of pensions 
of labour migrants is exported to the country of permanent residence. The same is true if a 
pensioner moves from one country to another. Besides, there is a clause that a person can 
give up receiving exported pension, and apply for pension according to local legislation. In this 
case, years of employment abroad are counted into service record at the same basis as years 
of local employment. 
So there is a broad range of agreements that create favorable environment for labour migra-
tion to Russia. The main drawback is that most of these agreements cover only regular migra-
tion, while a big portion of labour migrants are employed in the shadow economy. 
 
3. Challenges to Belarus’ labour market 
3.1. Demographical challenge 
Belarus’ labour market is characterized by widespread direct and indirect regulations in wage 
setting, hiring and firing procedures. These regulations aim at sustaining a low level of inequal-
ity and absolute poverty, and both of these tasks are largely achieved. For instance, the level 
of absolute poverty in Belarus in 2012 was just 6.3%, and the GINI coefficient was estimated 
at 0.265 in 2011, which is close to the level of Scandinavian countries (see IMP Research cen-
ter (2012)). Furthermore, regulations ensure a relatively low level of unemployment even at 
turbulent times (6.1% according to Census of 20091). However, the drawbacks of active labour 
market regulation are also evident. First, it is the low labour force mobility which hinders its 
reallocation from inefficient to efficient sectors of the economy. Second, low wage differentials 
produce little incentives for employees in terms of investing in their human capital and looking 
for better employment possibilities (see World Bank (2010)). Third, state-owned enterprises 
play a key role in Belarus economy and labour market, as the private sector stands for only 
30% of GDP. Labour productivity at state-owned enterprises is proved to be substantially lower 
compared to private companies, implying high potential for productivity increases in Belarus 
(see World Bank (2012)). 
These problems are aggravated by another challenge that Belarus has recently encountered. It 
is the reduction of the working force due to demographic factors. Labour resources, comprising 
employable working age individuals and employed people aged below or above working age, 
have been falling since 2008 (see Figure 1). The demographic forecasts provided either by UN 
or Belstat imply further deterioration of the demographic situation in Belarus. The structure of 
population will change: Share of elderly population will go up, while share of working age 
population will gradually fall, thus reducing employment. 
According to Belstat’s 20 years demographic forecasts, Belarus’ working age population will 
reduce by more than 0.5 m within the 2013–2020 period (see Figure 2). Consequently, the 
share of the working age population2 will fall from 60.1 to 55.6%. UN Population Department 
forecasts are even more pessimistic. According to the medium scenario, Belarus will suffer 
from a working age population reduction by 0.7 m in 2010 – 2020, and its share will drop from 
66 to 60%3. 
Long-term UN population forecasts show that the share of Belarus working age population (in-
dividuals 15-59 years old) will fall until 2050, reaching a minimum of 51.7%. The number of 
working age individuals will be only 4.1 m at that time, which is lower than current employ-
                                          
1 See Belstat (2011). Census 2009: Social-economic characteristics of Belarus population, 
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/census/2009/volume6.zip. 
2 Official definition. i.e. individuals aged between 15 and 55/60 for women and men, respectively. 
3 Working age population is defined as individuals aged between 15 and 60. See 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_indicators.htm. 
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ment figures. Even optimistic UN population forecast, implying higher fertility rates (by 0.5 
than in medium scenario)4, does not improve the situation until 2050. 
The negative trend in employment, subsequent to working-age population reduction, appeared 
in the end of 2011, i.e. with a three years lag. The reason for this short-term postponement 
was the growing economic participation rate at the end of the last decade (see Figure 3). In 
2004, only 69.6% of employable working age population was employed, while in 2011 this 
ratio was 75.8%.  
Increase of economic activity is not related to labour market policies, but should be attributed 
to the demographic factor, as the structure of working age population shifted towards preva-
lence of middle and upper working age groups. It implies that the share of students, character-
ized by low economic activity, among working age population has reduced, as those born in 
1980s have graduated from the universities and entered the labour market. The size of the 
following generation born in 1990s and graduating nowadays from universities is much less 
due to low birth rates during the first decade of transition. So, the share of students among 
working age population has stabilized and the trend of economic participation rate growth 
stopped. It immediately affected the number of employed individuals: employment reduced by 
2% in 2012 compared to 2010. 
Figure 1. Labour resources and employment 
Source: Belstat. 
Figure 2. Expected population dynamics 
Source: Belstat. 
 
Besides, a reduction of the labour force and employment are restrained by growing participa-
tion rate among individuals in the pension age (see Figure 3). In 2011, the share of those in 
the pension age continuing to work was 5.8%, which is significantly higher than half a decade 
ago (4.5% in 2006). Census data shows that economic activity remains high between women 
aged above 55-60 (39.4%) and men aged 60-65 (31.6%). Moreover, economic activity grows 
significantly with the level of education (see Shymanovich (2013)). Among individuals with 
higher education aged slightly above the pension age, economic activity rates are 56.5 and 
49.4 for women and men, respectively. Moreover, economic activity among men aged 65-70 
and women aged 60-65 with higher education is also relatively high (26.9 and 28.7% respec-
tively). The share of pension aged individuals within the labour force in Belarus reached 7.2% 
in 2011. It has potential for further growth, as the size of this group of population is growing 
and the level of education is increasing (Chubrik, Shymanovich (2013)), i.e. the propensity to 
stay employed among them will also increase. However, the productivity of pension-aged em-
ployees may be questioned.  
                                          
4 UN population forecast has been published prior to 2009 census data. Consequently, it does not take 
into account current upswing of birth rates. Hence, optimistic scenario provides currently better fit to 
actual population dynamics than medium scenario. 
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Figure 3. Participation rates 
Source: Belstat. 
Figure 4. Net migration 
Note. * Estimated for 1990–2009 as difference between 
actual population decrease, corrected after Censuses 1999 
and 2009, and natural decrease. 
Source: Chubrik, Shymanovich (2013). 
 
3.2. Scale and profile of labour migration 
Population forecasts, as presented in the previous section, are based on official migration data 
which underestimates the outflow of population, which in turn makes the labour market supply 
perspective even gloomier. The scale of migration underestimation can be traced through 
comparison of population dynamics, adjusted after the census 2009, natural increase/decrease 
of population and official migration balance. Official data shows that Belarus enjoys a perma-
nent net inflow of population. However, the difference between census adjusted population 
change and the natural decrease reveals that the migration balance is steady negative (see 
Figure 4). If one assumes that official migration statistics correctly estimates immigration, 
while underestimating emigration, it is possible to reconstruct realistic emigration dynamics. 
This exercise was done in Chubrik, Shymanovich, (2013) and it revealed that 254 thsd persons 
left Belarus in 2000–2009; meanwhile official number of emigrants in this period is just 113 
thsd persons. Hence, 2.5% of Belarus population left the country during the last decade. Over-
all, the number of emigrants in 1995–2011 is estimated at 430 thsd persons5. 
Another trend affecting Belarus’ labour market is temporary labour migration. Statistics on this 
phenomenon is very limited, as most of labour migration flows occur to Russia. Integration 
agreements between Belarus and Russia imply the absence of a border, and minimal barriers 
for Belarusians to get employed in Russia. Alongside with wide spread employment in the 
shadow economy, it makes a precise assessment of Belarusian labour migrants impossible. 
The most reliable source of information might have been the labour force survey that started 
in 2012, but its results are not published and are considered to be for official use only.  
The only sources of information on labour migrants in these circumstances are census and offi-
cial data on Belarusians employed abroad (registered as leaving Belarus based on the contract 
with foreign company). However, both of them significantly underestimate true scale of labour 
migration. Official statistics argues that only around 4 thsd of Belarusians are employed 
abroad, while census data revealed that 41.9 thsd people were employed abroad in 2009. Ac-
tual numbers are much higher, as part of labour migrants was not covered by census as they 
were abroad, and those covered might have preferred not to reveal their employment abroad 
for different reasons (see Chubrik, Kazlou (2013)). Experts of the Eurasian Development Bank 
(EDB) claim that the number of labour migrants in Russia may be in the range of 78.5 to 170.9 
thsd people. The estimates were based on 2010 balance of payments data, and different as-
sumptions on the share of income transferred home by labour migrants (EDB (2012)). 
Nevertheless, official and census data are the only sources of information casting light on the 
profile of labour migrants. Official data has been analyzed in Bobrova, Shahotska, Shy-
manovich (2012), while Chubrik and Kazlou (2013) have focused on the census. The key fea-
                                          
5 1995 is chosen as a base year, as it is the end year of the migration wave, occurred after Soviet Union 
dissolution (see Bobrova, Shahotska, Shymanovich (2012)). 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Particiapation rate, employable at working age
Particiapation rate, above working age (right axis)
% %
‐40
‐20
0
20
40
60
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
net migration flow estimated net migration flow*
thsd. persons
10 
ture of Belarus’ labour migration is the domination of the Russian vector. According to census 
data, more than 90% of labour migrants are employed in Russia (60% according to official 
data). Another characteristic is that the average labour migrant to Russia differs greatly from a 
migrant to other countries. First, Russia is a male-dominated direction (more than 90% by 
census data). Men also prevail among migrants to other countries, but that dominance is less 
strong. Women constitute around one third of all labour migrants to other countries, and are 
even prevalent in some directions (i.e. Italy according to official data). Second, the place of 
residence plays an important role in determining choice of employment abroad. Most of labour 
migrants to Russia are inhabitants of small and large cities other than Minsk. Besides, resi-
dents of eastern regions (Vitebsk, Mogilev) are more inclined to move to Russia, compared 
with average citizen of Belarus. Countries other than Russia are relatively attractive for citizens 
of Minsk and western regions (in absolute terms they also prefer employment in Russia). Third, 
the education level of labour migrants to Russia is lower than the average for the economic 
active population. In contrast, the level of education among non-Russia labour migrants is 
higher than the average. Fourth, most of migrants to Russia are employed in the construction 
(47.2%) and transport sector (11.1%). Among non-Russia labour migrants, the distribution of 
employment sectors are more even. Only transport sector stands out with the share of 22.8%. 
3.3. Labour migration effects across the economy 
The trends discussed above had only a narrow effect on Belarus’ economy during the pre-crisis 
period. The only sectors of the economy that suffered from labour migration were construction 
and transport. Employed persons abroad constituted 4.6% and 2%, respectively, of Belarus-
ians employed in these sectors6. These numbers should have significantly increased in 2011 – 
2012, when Belarus faced a severe currency crisis. Anecdotal evidence shows that the outflow 
of labour intensified in this period, which affected labour market, as there were shortages of 
labour supply in some sectors. This thesis can indirectly be supported by official statistics on 
labour mobility and wages. 
Labour mobility has been traditionally low in Belarus due to regulations of firing and hiring pro-
cedures and low wages differential. However, the termination turnover rate showed an in-
crease in last years. At the same time, hiring turnover rates remained largely unchanged, boil-
ing down to a reduction in employment in some sectors. It can be traced via the ratio of hires 
to terminations, presented in Table A6. The most intensive reduction of employment that took 
place in 2011 – 2012 is in construction, transport, and light industries (see Table 1). An espe-
cially low level of hires compared to terminations was in construction (and related to it, in pro-
duction of non-metallic mineral products) in 2011, when the sector began to contract. 
Table 1. Labour mobility and wages differential between Belarus and Russia  
by sectors, believed to be suffering from labour outflow 
 
Ratio of hires to terminations, 
% 
Wage gap between Russia 
and Belarus, %* 
2010 2011 2012 2013 H1 2010 2011 2012 
2013 
M5 
Average 102.0 92.8 95.2 86.6 -41.6 -54.8 -48.8 -39.3 
manufacture of textiles and textile articles  86.7 86.0 79.6 66.9 -11.5 -23.4 -11.9 3.9 
manufacture of leather, articles of leather,
and footwear  102.8 96.8 78.5 88.5 -4.1 -26.3 -8.5 10.2 
processing of wood and manufacture of
products of wood  98.8 85.5 83.8 81.2 -16.1 -37.3 -25.3 -6.5 
Construction 108.3 72.8 84.0 106.5 -27.6 -49.3 -38.2 -19.7 
trade; repair of motor vehicles and house-
hold and personal goods 107.9 100.6 110.9 99.2 -39.9 -51.3 -41.7 -26.2 
transport and communications  100.0 89.7 91.1 85.8 -43.8 -59.0 -50.1 -41.5 
health and social work 104.3 102.4 104.5 78.0 -37.8 -49.6 -46.2 -46.5 
Note. * Wages prior to income taxation and 1% social contribution in case of Belarus. 
Source: Belstat, Russian Statistical Committee. 
 
                                          
6 According to specialization, 9.2% of Belarus’ non-qualified construction and mining workers were em-
ployed abroad (see Chubrik, Kazlou (2013)). 
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Obviously, a big portion of the workforce that left was employed in Russia. While Russian con-
struction and transport sectors have traditionally been attractive for the Belarusian workforce, 
light industry labour migration was a new trend. There was a lot of anecdotal evidence that 
workers from the Eastern part of Belarus from textile manufacturing, as well as wood products 
manufacturing, got employed by Russian companies allocated in the regions close to Belarus’ 
border. The reason for this was a growing gap between wages in Russia and Belarus as a con-
sequence of currency crisis of 2011. Average wages in construction and transport in Russia 
were two times higher than in Belarus in 2011. For light industry, the average annual gap was 
around 30%. Obviously it was even higher at the second part of the year when the exchange 
rate of the Belarusian rouble to the Russian rouble reached its minimum. 
In 2012, the wage differential began to narrow. It mainly had effect on pre-border migration; 
as wages in Smolensk or Briansk regions are much lower than average in Russia7. Wage in-
crease and falling labour migration can be attributed to public policies aimed at a recovery of 
household incomes, enterprise wage policies that had to raise wages in order to stop the out-
flow of the workforce, as well as administrative decisions to limit labour mobility. Furthermore, 
the current economic slowdown in Russia also contributed to the gap reduction. In fact, in May 
2013 wages in some sectors of light industry were even higher in Belarus than in Russia, for 
instance in textile manufacturing (see Table 1 and A6 for details). In construction, the gap has 
reduced to 20%. It is still a pull factor for Belarus construction workers, but it won’t lead to 
labour migration at a scale which was observed in 2011. Moreover, there might be a return 
flow of labour migrants, as currently a number of hires (in January-June 2013) exceed the 
number of terminations in construction by 6.5% (see Table 1). This trend may have a middle-
term nature, as construction is currently discussed to become once again the locomotive of the 
Belarus economy.  
 
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
In the following part, we sum up the previous discussion on the challenges Belarus currently 
faces in its labour market, and give some concrete policy recommendations on how to tackle 
them. 
4.1. Challenges 
 Belarus’ labour market is experiencing an increasing shortage of the labour supply due to 
long-term demographic factors. The problem might be aggravated at different time hori-
zons by labour migration, which is increasingly driven by wage differentials between Bela-
rus and Russia. Russia is a key destination country as there is no language barrier, cultural 
proximity and limited regulatory barriers due to different integration agreements between 
Belarus and Russia.  
 The most inclined persons to get employed abroad are male non-qualified construction 
workers. However, low incomes may push also female workers from light industry and ser-
vices to look for employment possibilities abroad. Besides, labour migration is accompanied 
by a brain drain, as highly motivated and educated persons (top managers, engineers) are 
also leaving to Russia, where they can enjoy higher salaries.  
 Another structural problem is the growing dependency ratio, and the observed labour out-
flow aggravates the problem. Possible negative consequences of regular labour migration 
on the social security system are partly mitigated by the agreement with Russia on the ex-
port of pensions. However, the scale of regular labour migration is currently not that big, 
and irregular migration creates pressure on the social security system, as migrants do not 
pay contributions (i.e. do not contribute to pay the current pensions), but will need to be 
supported later on during retirement (i.e. additional expenditures, that might have been 
carried by the Russian budget, if migrants had been officially employed). 
 Thus, challenges related to labour migration have a short-, medium- and long-term per-
spective. While the reduction of labour supply immediately transforms into a labour short-
age (or reduction of unemployment in theory), the associated brain drain and growing fu-
                                          
7 In the first half of 2013 wages in Smolensk and Briansk regions were 33.4 and 36.8% lower than aver-
age in Russia. 
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ture expenditures in the social security system create additional downward pressure on 
productivity and competitiveness of the Belarusian economy. 
4.2. Solutions 
 Economic policy has reacted in different ways to the pressure from the existing wage dif-
ferential, which is a main factor for short-term migration decisions. On the one hand, 
broad-based domestic wage increases lowered the wage gap, and thus tried to slow down 
(or reverse) migration outflows. On the other hand, administrative decisions in certain in-
dustries affected (e.g. the wood processing industry) created new barriers for migration. 
Taken together, one can speak of a “stick and carrot” approach followed by the authorities. 
 While the domestic wage increases made employment in CES partner countries (e.g. Rus-
sia) less attractive, and thus were in line with their objective, they created new problems. 
The current situation is characterized by significant increases in unit-labour costs, as nomi-
nal wage and income gains are not supported by productivity gains. Thus, the sustainability 
of this move is in doubt, and in a negative scenario, this might lead to a similar situation 
prior to the 2011 balance of payments crisis, which was also caused by overly expansionary 
macroeconomic policies. Similarly, the administrative restriction of labour mobility (at least 
in economic terms) is problematic, as it interferes with an optimal and welfare-enhancing 
allocation of resources.  
 Thus, another approach should be followed, which tackles the existing problem with a dif-
ferent set of instruments. Such a new strategy of structural changes would include the fol-
lowing components: 
o Sustainable domestic wage increases should not lead productivity gains, but follow 
them. Thus, the key focus is on generating such gains. Increasing the mobility of 
the labour force (relocation) across sectors will certainly have a positive impact, as 
a lot of potential is still underutilized.  
o For this, a wide-ranging liberalization of the labour market is a key condition. This 
implies also a de-coupling of social policy issues from labour market policies to some 
extent. 
o Mobility means also creating more opportunities for private sector initiatives, i.e. 
SME development should be further facilitated. 
o In this context, a favourable business environment plays a key role as a driver. 
However, it is also a key attraction for return migration. It is often argued that re-
turn migration transforms the previous brain drain into additional gains to the econ-
omy, as returnees brings new knowledge, technologies and investments. Therefore 
reduction of tax rates, introduction of different privileges and provision of financial 
and technical support together with concessional loans to small enterprises may be 
especially effective in mitigating labour market challenges.  
o Next might be the introduction of specific and attractive job opportunities for those 
who work abroad and have western experience. That might include consulting and 
training services and managing positions in enterprises. Moreover, measures should 
also include promotion of foreign education and recognition of diplomas received 
abroad.  
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Annex 1: Labour migration in Poland and Baltic countries after EU enlargement 
Scale of migration, push and pull factors 
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 had a great impact on migration flows in Poland and Baltic 
countries. Free access to European labour markets stimulated a substantial outflow of labour 
force from that region. People from EU-8 were no longer subject to any working restrictions 
and obtained a possibility to work without any work permit, which was a requirement before. 
However most of EU-15 countries used the possibility to introduce transition periods (up to 7 
years) before opening labour markets for citizens of EU-8. The only countries that immediately 
provided opportunities of a common labour market for EU-8 citizens were the UK, Ireland, and 
Sweden. As a result, the UK and Ireland became key destination countries for labour migrants 
from CEE. In addition, Germany remained an attractive market for low skilled seasonal work-
ers from Poland, where the duration of stay equalled to two-three months on average. Even 
though Germany was one of the last who opened its market for emigrants from Eastern Eu-
rope, it was quite easy to obtain a work permit there in case of proving existence of German 
ancestry or registering as an individual entrepreneur.  
Table A1 shows the number of emigrants that left LT, LV, PL during 2002-2011, proving the 
increasing number of people leaving the countries after the accession to the EU. Statistics from 
receiving countries also proves growing labour migration (Table A2). According to UK data, the 
number of emigrants from LT, LV, PL with a resident permit in 2011 equalled to 64, 134 and 
687 thsd, respectively. Taking into account that the level of employment in the UK for people 
from EU-8 amounted to 80%, it is possible to say that in 2011 the number of working emi-
grants from LT, LV, PL was equal to 51, 107 and 550 thsd of people, correspondingly. In turn, 
this forms around 5%, 7% and 3% of the active labour force of the country of origin. As for 
Germany, the situation looks similar. As the data shows, in 2011 the amount of emigrants 
from these three countries was 18, 27 and 469 thsd, which equals to around 2% of active la-
bour force in the countries.  
Table A1. Emigrants by country of origin statistics 
Latvia Lithuania Poland 
2002 3 262 7 086 24 532 
2003 2 210 11 032 20 813 
2004 2 744 15 165 18 877 
2005 2 450 15 571 22 242 
2006 5 252 12 602 46 936 
2007 4 183 13 853 35 480 
2008 6 007 17 015 74 338 
2009 7 388 21 970 n/a 
2010 10 702 83 157 n/a 
2011 30 380 53 863 n/a 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
Table A2. Number of immigrants from Baltic states and Poland in UK and Germany by 
country of destination statistics 
  Latvia Lithuania Poland 
UK 
Number of immigrants 51000 107000 550000 
% in active labour force 4.96% 7.22% 3.09% 
Germany 
Number of immigrants 18200 27800 468500 
% in active labour force 1.77% 1.87% 2.63% 
Note. Data for UK is presented after adjustment to economic activity rate of immigrants. For Germany no 
adjustment has been done. 
Source: Office for National statistics, Population by Nationality and Country of Birth Report, August 2012, 
and LFS (EMP06: Employment levels and rates by country of birth and nationality, May 2013) for UK, and 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Ausländische Bevölkerung: Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters 2011 for 
Germany. 
 
The main reasons for such active migration processes were pretty much the same in all new 
members of the EU (Frelak, Kazmierkiewicz (2007); Kadziauskas (2007)). Low wages, espe-
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cially compared with the EU level, high unemployment rates, a large gap in GDP per capita, 
lack of confidence in further improvement of life quality and lack of opportunities pushed peo-
ple towards the West European labour market. As it can be seen from Table A3 in 2004-2005 
minimum wages in Poland and Baltic countries were almost 10 times lower compared with the 
level in UK and Ireland. However, if we compare average wages, the difference is smaller (Ta-
ble A3). Thus, this is evidence that earnings distribution in EU is flatter as compared with LT, 
LV, PL. Therefore, low skilled labour force has more incentives to migrate, as opportunity costs 
of their migration are higher compared with qualified specialists, which proves statements pro-
vided earlier (Kahanec, Zimmermann (2009)). Thus, it is possible to claim that the wage gap 
was a strong pull factor towards migration for low skilled labour force in LT, LV, PL.  
High risks of unemployment in CEE were a key push factor for labour migration. On the other 
hand, unemployment rates in key destination countries were low. The reason for high unem-
ployment in LT, LV, Pl was rooted in the low quality of the education system, provoking mis-
match of labour supply and demand. The problem was that the share of people with higher 
education was relatively high compared with developed countries. However, these specialists 
didn’t meet the requirements of the market due to quality of education they obtained while 
studying in universities. As a result, the employers were not satisfied with the quality and were 
not ready to hire them. 
The global economic crisis of 2008/09 led to the second wave of emigration out of these coun-
tries. High rates of GDP growth (Table A5) were followed by recession. Reduction of exports 
and foreign investments together with decrease of domestic consumption caused new outflows 
of the labour force towards Western European markets. 
Economic outcomes of labour migration in Poland and Baltic states 
Emigration of workers from Poland and Baltic countries to Western Europe influenced the eco-
nomic situation in different directions. On the one hand, it allowed increasing the level of wag-
es in the countries and as a result, the average level of earnings in general. The outflow of 
labour force stimulates employers in taking efforts to attract employees’ staying in the compa-
nies through increasing wages and providing other non-pecuniary benefits. Besides, emigration 
had a positive impact on reduction of unemployment in the country. Unemployment rates 
started to decrease in LT, LV, PL after the access to the EU (see Table A3). The global econom-
ic crisis contributed negatively and was followed by sharp growth of unemployment in the 
countries. However, a new migration wave helped to stabilize these threatening tendencies of 
a rapid growth of unemployment. In addition, the labour force that migrated from the coun-
tries positively influenced the home economy through the flows of remittances, which were 
sent to their home countries. 
On the other hand, the dynamics of emigration raises concerns regarding possible effects it 
may have on the economies in the future. One of the negative consequences of outflow of la-
bour force from Poland and Baltic countries is that all three countries have problems with aging 
populations. Thus, emigration may aggravate a demographic problem for the countries, espe-
cially in Latvia and Lithuania. The problem becomes even more serious if we keep in mind that 
after the EU enlargement, the proportion of young people who decided to emigrate from Baltic 
countries was higher compared with the emigration wave of early 90s. Therefore, the pressure 
on the social security system in the countries becomes much more severe. Another problem 
widely discussed is brain drain. The accession to the EU allowed not only low-skilled (like 
workers from construction sector and agriculture), but also talented and well-qualified workers 
to move abroad in order to obtain much higher earnings there. That was a particular problem 
with medical workers and engineers. However, such a brain drain may also have a positive 
effect on the economies. That might occur in case of stimulation of return migration. Experi-
ence abroad might be a great opportunity to improve and upgrade the level of knowledge and 
skills, develop networking, which will be very useful after returning back home. 
Policy adjustment to high labour mobility 
It should be noted that the authorities took several steps in order to activate a remigration 
process. However, these measures didn’t have a strong effect so far. Mostly, the authorities 
raised worries regarding the situation with the outflow of labour force. On the one hand, there 
were attempts to stimulate business development in the countries as well as communication 
with people who decided to move abroad. On the other, these measures were rather general 
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and didn’t help to achieve a goal and make people to come back home. Thus, nowadays coun-
tries are in a need of more specific actions that will turn back the migration process, otherwise 
they will have to make an accent on attraction of foreign immigrants into the countries.  
Currently the inflow of immigrants is much lower compared with outflow (see Table A4). 
Among immigrants, who moved to these countries were people from neighbouring Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova, which are going through a difficult transition period. Poland can be high-
lighted as a country that already has in place policy measures aimed at attracting employees 
from ENP countries to cover the deficit in low skilled labour force, observed in some sectors 
due to labour migration to the EU. However, before 2011 it was to a large extent presented in 
the form of illegal employment. First, these were seasonal workers mostly from Ukraine, who 
came to Poland to work in the agricultural and construction sectors. Second were those who 
came working as housekeepers and attendants. Third were those who worked in Polish enter-
prises without properly registered and formalized documents. In order to cope with that situa-
tion, Poland introduced in 2011 a reduced employment system, meaning that a polish employ-
er who wants to hire workers from Belarus or Ukraine have just to inform local employment 
bureau and provide evidence that foreigner doesn’t have any debts or claims from law en-
forcement agencies back home. It should be noted that nevertheless this situation didn’t at-
tract much people from Belarus, who are mostly interested not in seasonal agricultural jobs 
but in receiving a Pole’s card (document that confirms belonging to Polish nation) that will 
permanently legalize their status in the country. 
Summing up, there were no distinct successful results achieved by LT, LV, PL in coping with 
their labour outflow after EU accession. Thus, the international organizations advise to put 
more emphasis on clear policy actions. According to the International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOM), the possible directions of a policy focused on activation of return migration should 
include measures on improvement of macroeconomic situation as well as business environ-
ment and stimulation of development of small and medium business. That includes reduction 
of tax rates, introduction of different privileges and provision of financial and technical support 
together with concessional loans to small enterprises. Next might be the introduction of specif-
ic and attractive job opportunities for those who work abroad and have western experience. 
That might include consulting and training services and managing positions in enterprises. 
Moreover, according to IOM, measures should also include promotion of foreign education and 
recognition of diplomas received abroad.  
Table A3. Wages, unemployment rates and GDP per capita in Poland, Baltic States 
and several EU-15 member states 
Ireland Latvia Lithuania Netherlands Poland UK 
Average monthly earnings (EUR) 
2003 1 200.10 181.72 177.59 1 765.03 292.65 1 831.71 
2004 1 264.16 196.78 216.90 1 838.18 290.33 1 955.40 
2005 1 309.37 219.53 239.56 1 875.07 337.46 2 008.72 
2006 1 353.13 269.44 281.36 1 844.40 365.58 2 087.18 
2007 1 409.82 345.93 345.63 1 903.97 415.28 2 200.20 
2008 1 471.53 419.24 404.41 1 956.43 459.05 1 897.22 
2009 1 437.72 428.10 376.90 2 010.25 385.44 1 693.00 
2010 1 460.59 424.64 369.93 2 054.16 432.44 1 808.03 
2011 1 484.71 442.99 379.60 2 080.80 447.50 1 779.51 
Minimum wages (EUR/month) 
2003 1 073.15 114.01 124.55 1 249.2 198.96 1 063.80 
2004 1 073.15 118.96 130.34 1 264.8 175.25 1 054.20 
2005 1 183.00 114.63 144.81 1 264.8 207.86 1 134.67 
2006 1 292.85 129.27 159.29 1 272.6 232.90 1 212.61 
2007 1 402.70 172.12 173.77 1 300.8 244.32 1 314.97 
2008 1 461.85 229.75 231.70 1 335.0 313.34 1 242.24 
2009 1 461.85 254.13 231.70 1 381.2 307.21 995.28 
2010 1 461.85 253.77 231.70 1 407.6 320.87 1 076.46 
2011 1 461.85 281.93 231.70 1 424.4 348.68 1 136.22 
2012 1 461.85 285.92 231.70 1 446.6 336.47 1 201.96 
Unemployment 
2003 4.6 11.3 12.4 4.2 19.8 5.0 
2004 4.5 11.2 11.3 5.1 19.1 4.7 
2005 4.4 9.6 8.0 5.3 17.9 4.8 
16 
Ireland Latvia Lithuania Netherlands Poland UK 
2006 4.5 7.3 5.2 4.4 13.9 5.4 
2007 4.7 6.5 3.8 3.6 9.6 5.3 
2008 6.4 8.0 5.3 3.1 7.1 5.6 
2009 12.0 18.2 13.6 3.7 8.1 7.6 
2010 13.9 19.8 18.0 4.5 9.7 7.8 
2011 14.7 16.2 15.3 4.4 9.7 8.0 
2012 14.7 14.9 13.3 5.3 10.1 7.9 
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards/PPS, index (EU28=100) 
2003 142 44 50 129 49 121 
2004 143 47 52 129 51 123 
2005 144 50 55 131 51 123 
2006 145 53 58 131 52 121 
2007 145 57 62 132 54 117 
2008 131 58 65 134 56 113 
2009 128 54 58 132 61 111 
2010 127 54 61 131 63 111 
2011 129 58 66 131 64 109 
2012 129 62 70 128 66 110 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
 
Table A4. Number of immigrants in Poland, Baltic states  
 Latvia Lithuania Poland 
2002 1 428 5 110 6 587 
2003 1 364 4 728 7 048 
2004 1 665 5 553 9 495 
2005 1 886 6 789 9 364 
2006 2 801 7 745 10 802 
2007 3 541 8 609 14 995 
2008 3 465 9 297 47 880 
2009 2 688 6 487 n/a 
2010 2 364 5 213 n/a 
2011 7 253 15 685 n/a 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
 
Table A5. Real GDP growth in Poland, Baltic states 
Latvia Lithuania Poland 
2003 7.6 10.3 3.9 
2004 8.9 7.4 5.3 
2005 10.1 7.8 3.6 
2006 11.2 7.8 6.2 
2007 9.6 9.8 6.8 
2008 -3.3 2.9 5.1 
2009 -17.7 -14.8 1.6 
2010 -0.9 1.5 3.9 
2011 5.5 5.9 4.5 
2012 5.6 3.7 1.9 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
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Annex 2: Detailed labour market statistics by sectors of the economy 
Table A6. Labour mobility and wage differentials between Belarus and Russia 
 
Ratio of hires to terminations, 
% 
Wage gap between Russia 
and Belarus, %* 
2010 2011 2012 2013 H1 2010 2011 2012 
2013 
M5 
Average 102.0 92.8 95.2 86.6 -41.6 -54.8 -48.8 -39.3 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry   92.8 92.8 94.4 93.4 -19.0 -39.0 -26.3 -6.3 
Fishing and fish farming   103.5 104.4 94.4 87.5 -62.2 -69.1 -64.2 -57.7 
Industry 99.0 94.7 91.7 89.2 -- -- -- -- 
Mining and quarrying industry 107.9 106.0 89.4 80.7 -51.4 -63.9 -58.6 -52.0 
Manufacturing 98.7 94.4 91.3 87.4 -27.8 -43.1 -35.0 -24.2 
manufacture of food products, including 
beverages, and tobacco 109.3 100.5 100.4 103.6 -24.4 -39.7 -30.2 -17.4 
manufacture of textiles and textile arti-
cles  86.7 86.0 79.6 66.9 -11.5 -23.4 -11.9 3.9 
manufacture of leather, articles of 
leather, and footwear  102.8 96.8 78.5 88.5 -4.1 -26.3 -8.5 10.2 
processing of wood and manufacture of 
products of wood  98.8 85.5 83.8 81.2 -16.1 -37.3 -25.3 -6.5 
manufacture of pulp and paper; publish-
ing 97.2 86.0 83.9 75.8 -37.4 -50.0 -43.7 -31.4 
manufacture of coke, petroleum prod-
ucts and nuclear materials 111.1 108.1 101.8 74.3 -39.0 -52.9 -47.1 -34.9 
manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products 108.1 89.1 82.2 83.5 -1.3 -19.7 -15.4 -8.9 
manufacture of rubber and plastics 
products  102.5 99.6 97.9 86.5 -12.5 -21.9 -4.6 4.3 
manufacture of other non-metallic min-
eral products 104.0 80.4 92.1 93.6 -20.2 -44.3 -34.6 -19.2 
manufacture of basic metals and fabri-
cated metal products 101.3 96.1 104.3 79.4 -24.5 -38.9 -31.3 -21.6 
manufacture of machinery and equip-
ment  91.9 94.0 91.5 79.9 -29.9 -45.3 -36.2 -27.2 
manufacture of electrical, electronic and 
optical equipment  97.3 84.3 72.4 63.0 -40.8 -54.5 -48.5 -39.1 
manufacture of motor vehicles and 
equipment  81.3 112.9 96.2 76.4 -30.8 -46.1 -36.7 -31.7 
other manufacturing  106.7 105.7 95.2 91.4 -16.7 -27.0 -17.9 2.0 
Production and distribution of electricity, 
gas and water 99.5 95.4 94.1 73.5 -42.2 -58.8 -52.4 -44.6 
Construction 108.3 72.8 84.0 106.5 -27.6 -49.3 -38.2 -19.7 
Trade; repair of motor vehicles and house-
hold and personal goods 107.9 100.6 110.9 99.2 -39.9 -51.3 -41.7 -26.2 
Hotels and restaurants  97.9 94.1 102.2 119.6 -40.1 -50.1 -40.5 -26.8 
Transport and communications  100.0 89.7 91.1 85.8 -43.8 -59.0 -50.1 -41.5 
Financial activities 122.2 105.5 104.1 95.2 -56.9 -66.7 -61.3 -55.6 
Real estate, renting and business services  106.3 95.7 94.8 98.7 -38.2 -52.8 -46.7 -34.0 
Research and development   98.0 89.3 88.7 84.6 -44.0 -59.8 -57.1 -50.2 
Public administration   97.9 95.8 93.8 33.3 -38.4 -56.2 -59.0 -51.5 
Education 104.2 102.9 93.5 63.2 -35.7 -46.9 -45.7 -48.4 
Health and social work 104.3 102.4 104.5 78.0 -37.8 -49.6 -46.2 -46.5 
Community, social and personal services 103.2 97.5 98.4 80.1 -32.7 -50.7 -46.3 -40.0 
Note. Wages prior to income taxation and 1% social contribution in case of Belarus. Wages comparison at 
industry level is not available. 
Source: Belstat, Russian Statistical Committee. 
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